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From Mill Town to Mill Town: The Transition of a New England Town from a
Textile to a High-Technology Economy
John R. Mullin, Jeanne H. Armstrong, and Jean S. Kavanagh
This article describes and analyzes the economic transformation of Maynard, Massachusetts. Located
twenty-six miles west of Boston, Maynard was the home of the world’s largest woolen mill. In 1950 the
mill closed and 1,200 jobs were lost. During the next ten years, the town gradually recovered as the mill
became the home of several innovative companies. Ultimately, the mill became the headquarters for the
world’s largest manufacturer of minicomputers. The circle is now complete: the mill is full and houses a
company that claims a “world’s largest” designation. The article analyses the rise and fall of the American
Woolen Company; examines the steps taken to stimulate recovery, and their results; identifies and
examines the important elements that led to the economic transformation; and offers potential lessons for
planners in towns undergoing similar changes.

A traveler moving through the mill towns of Massachusetts in the 1950s and
1960s could not help noticing one abandoned mill after another. Travelers making the
same journey today would still see much evidence of decline, neglect, and abandonment;
but they would also see evidence of rebirth. Many of these mills have been revitalized
and now house the high-technology and light manufacturing companies that are the
backbone of the Massachusetts economy today.
Nowhere can the transformation be seen more vividly than in the town of
Maynard, about twenty-five miles west of Boston. Maynard was the home of the
American Woolen Company’s Assabet Mill. Named after the Assabet River, which
provided its original power, the mill was the largest woolen factory in the world through
the first one-third of the century. Beginning during the 1920s, the Assabet Mill gradually
declined until it finally was closed in 1950. About 1,200 jobs ultimately were eliminated,
and the dominant man-made feature of the town, the eleven-acre mill site, was left empty.
Three years later, the mill was purchased by Maynard Industries Incorporated, which
immediately began renting raw space to industrial tenants. By 1960 more than thirty
small firms were located in the complex. In 1970 the entire mill complex was purchased
and occupied by the Digital Equipment Corporation, which would become the largest
producer of minicomputers in the world. The circle was complete: the town once again
had become a “mill town” in which one firm was the major employer, owned the most
important real estate, and controlled the most influential land uses.1 The mill also
continued to retain its “world’s largest” designation – now applied to the Digital
Equipment Corporation.
Scores of cities and towns in eastern New England lost their key industries in this
same period. Yet few recovered as quickly or as rapidly as Maynard. What separated
Maynard from the others? It is a difficult question to answer. Certainly the availability
of cheap space, a large labor supply, and a prime location were helpful. But these same
assets could be found elsewhere. Certainly governmental cooperation and the availability
of infrastructural systems were important. But these same elements could be found in
virtually all industrial cities and towns in the area. Thus a case cannot be made that
Maynard had any more of an advantage than any other city or town in terms of basic
assets.
Two key differences are apparent. First, the companies that rented space in the
mill in the 1950s and 1960s were mainly modern, growth-oriented companies that had

few ties to the collapsing mature industries of the area. In essence, there was a clean
break with the town’s previous industrial base. Second, the local municipality had its
fiscal affairs under control. There was little debt and little growth pressure, and very few
people were receiving welfare assistance or unemployment insurance even after the mill
closed. These factors contributed to a sense, on the part of the community leaders and
residents, that the mill once again would prosper and serve as a job generator.
In short, it appears that the reindustrialization of Maynard occurred because of the
presence of all of the basic assets needed to attract industry; the patient, passive role of
town government; the entrepreneurial skills of the mill owners in attracting new
companies; and the emphasis on marketing toward new, innovative, growth-oriented
companies. Above all, it is a case where market forces, gently nudged, were able to work
as they should.
This article describes and analyzes how the transition “from mill town to mill
town’ occurred. It begins with a description of the town in the post-World War II period
and reviews what caused the collapse of the textile industry in general and the American
Woolen Company in particular. From there the article analyzes the efforts of the town,
private organizations, and individual companies to revitalize the mill, emphasizing the
reasons various firms located in the mill during the transition period. It also describes the
rise of the Digital Equipment Corporation and its steady takeover of the complex.
Finally, the article isolates and analyzes the critical factors that influenced the
revitalization of the Assabet Mill. It ends with lessons that may be of benefit to planners
involved with similar opportunities.
The Road to Collapse
The rise and fall of the American Woolen Company
The town of Maynard owes its existence to its location along the Assabet River.2
With its natural falls and steep slopes, the river was ideal for Colonial Period saw and
flour mills and early Industrial Age factories (Bagnall 1893, 552). Industrialization really
came to the area, however, with the formation of the Assabet Manufacturing Company in
1846. Through bankruptcies, reorganizations, almost continual expansion, and the boomand-bust periods of the nineteenth century, the company emerged as the owner of the
largest woolen factory in the world (Stone 1930, 1013). Not long after it gained that
distinction it went bankrupt again, and the complex of buildings was purchased in 1898
by the newly formed American Woolen Company. This company, through steady growth
over the next twenty-five years, ultimately would control 20 percent of the nation’s
woolen textile market, run sixty factories, have more than 40,000 workers, and earn more
than $100 m8illion in total profits. It was considered to be a “manufacturing empire and
a quasi-monopoly” and had “enough fat to sustain it for decades” (Cole 1923, 442;
Roddy 1982, 113; Saunders 1954, 93).
But the company suffered reversals between 1924 and 1938, losing money in all
but one of those years. Prosperity returned during the years just before World War II and
lasted through the immediate postwar period. Finally, except in the Korean War year of
1951, the company lost millions of dollars between 1949 and 1954 (American Woolen
1954). In 1955 Textron bought the company and gradually liquidated it over the next
several years (Textron 1955, 25).

The Assabet Mill began to be phased out of production in 1947, when the
company closed the facility for a forced Easter vacation (Time 1947, 83). From then
until 1950 the mill experienced a steady decline in production orders and assigned
workers. Employees were laid off, called back, and finally terminated as the demand for
woolens declined. In December 1950, the company permanently closed the mill and
terminated 1,200 workers.
The collapse of the American Woolen Company followed the pattern of many of
the traditional heavy manufacturing companies that dotted the New England landscape.
Its mills were old, operated by union labor, heavily taxed, and run by management that
was unwilling to invest in modernizing facilities. Southern textile mills, with their new
equipment, new buildings, low taxes, and non-union work force, clearly had an advantage
(Business Week, 16 February 1952, 38).
The Assabet Mill fit the criteria for shutdown. The buildings were, on average,
more than fifty years old; the company had chosen not to modernize the facility in a
postwar reinvestment program, and its equipment was, therefore, outmoded. Its work
force had a tradition of militant unionism and a history of strikes. Finally, the structures
were heavily taxed. Few were surprised when the company shut down the factory
(Saunders 1954, 94). In the final analysis, from a management perspective, there was
little choice.3
Maynard and its Mill: 1945-1950
The town of Maynard came out of the postwar era with little municipal debt and
little unemployment (Town of Maynard 1950, 5). In essence, the town was in a strong
position to control its growth. Its water and sewer systems and major roads were in good
condition and had the capacity for expansion. With little space for population growth,
there was minimal need to raise taxes for new schools, libraries, or other facilities. A
casual visitor in the 1945-1947 period would have seen, on the surface, a healthy, hardworking, and relatively prosperous working-class town that had a secure economic base.
After 1947 the townspeople began to realize that the mill was in final decline.
The layoff and callback cycles became increasingly common, while in each cycle the
total demand for workers lessened. This gradual decline meant that the workers were
able to anticipate the shutdown and prepare themselves for work elsewhere.
Throughout 1951 the Assabet Mill remained idle. The dormancy of the mill was
not reflected, however, in the local economy. Ironically, while newspaper accounts
reportedly stated the town was “flat on its back”, welfare and unemployment payments
actually decreased (Harrington 1964, 7). There are three key reasons the closing of the
mill had little economic effect on the town. First, the town was on the fringe of
metropolitan Boston and within easy commuting distance of other bustling non-textile
mills and factories. Second, the mill workers often had come from two-income families.
To ensure that both partners would not suffer from the insecurities of textile employment,
one typically would work outside the mill. Choices included work in Maynard’s central
business district (the shopping area for a six-town area) and factories in nearby towns
(The New York Times 1954, 1). Third, the mill workers who remained until the end
tended to be older and, when the mill finally closed, opted for retirement. Their names
did not appear on the unemployment rolls. In sum, the phenomenon was surprising to the

town’s governing board, who after requesting disaster assistance from the federal
government, were unable to prove where the disaster happened.4
The town began trying to revive the mill almost from the moment it closed. With
no history of formal municipal planning and no professional staff, the town leaders
determined that the best approach would be to organize a citizens committee to develop
recommendations for reviving the mill. The committee began work by examining mill
communities that had gone through the trauma of a major factory closing and had
recovered (Boston Globe 1950). It immediately focused on Nashua, New Hampshire. In
1948 Nashua had suffered the loss of the Textron-owned Nashua Manufacturing
Company, a company that made blankets and employed 3,500 workers, 15 percent of the
city’s workforce (Fortune 1948). After the mill closed, Nashua had organized a
nonprofit corporation to finance, purchase, and market the mill facilities. Within two
years, 85 percent of the space had been rented, all mortgages and loans had been retired,
and a substantial amount of working capital was in the bank (Business Week 1950). After
consulting with Nashua’s leaders, among others, Maynard began to develop its strategy
(Boston Globe 1950). Because of the experiences of Nashua there was a quiet sense of
confidence among town leaders that the mill facilities could become viable again.
The American Woolen Company, aware of the town’s efforts to take action, held
out one last straw of hope. Provided that local citizens would invest in the plant, that
local financial institutions would grant loans for new equipment, that local taxes would
be cut, and that local hourly wages would be lowered to the levels earned by southern
workers, the company said, it would reconsider reopening the mill.5 There was little
local support for this set of conditions (The New York Times 1954, 1). The Maynard
workers expressed no desire to become a one-industry town ever again and had little
confidence in the American Woolen Company to follow through on its proposals (Town
of Maynard 1952, 5). Their perceptions were accurate.
The Mill Booms Again
In July 1953, eighteen months after it closed the Assabet Mill, the American
Woolen Company sold the complex to a group of Worcester businessmen who had
created a company called Maynard Industries Incorporated (The New York Times 1953).
The company’s goal was to market the space in the mill for diversified industries. It was
to have a remarkable success record for the next sixteen years.
The purchase price for the mill complex was $200,000. That figure reflected the
opinion of the American Woolen Company that the structures were worth little more than
scrap value. Actually, the net worth of the facilities, according to assessor’s records, was
$839,145,6 so it is clear that Maynard Industries obtained a bargain. The company
immediately began to market the space. Within six months it attracted the Bracon
Company, a plastics firm, as its first major tenant. Within one year, half of the mill space
was rented (Town of Maynard 1954, 4). Also with one year, at Maynard Industries’ first
industrial show, thirty-two companies had exhibits (Clair 1966, 28). By 1960 the mill
was fully rented.
Typically, three types of companies chose to rent space in the mill. One type was
the newly formed company developing new products (today often referred to as a
“starter” industry). The Bracon Company was characteristic of this type. When its

management was asked why the company came to the mill, the reasons given were cheap
space, a trainable labor force, and proximity to Greater Boston’s research and
development firms, laboratories, and universities. Bracon ultimately employed 200
workers before it was purchased by the American Can Company.7 Other companies of
this type were involved in activities ranging from publishing, mold injecting, tool
making, and woodworking to data processing and computer manufacture.
The second type of company that located in the Assabet Mill was the expanding
company whose main plant was nearby. The Dennison Manufacturing Company, a paper
company, was an example of this kind of firm. Its facilities in Framingham, thirteen
miles distant, were at capacity. Needing more space and wanting quick access to its new
operations, the company management decided the Assabet Mill was ideal. The company
moved one of its paper manufacturing operations to Maynard in 1953.
The third general type of company attracted to the mill was the company that
needed to consolidate its operations. The Raytheon Corporation, a manufacturer of
military equipment, was an example of this type of company. Its missile systems division
had continued to grow until it was located in several sites throughout Greater Boston.
The company management believed that being spread out was inefficient and in 1956
decided to consolidate this 1,200-worker division in the Assabet Mill (Raytheon 1956,
10). It is clear that readily available, inexpensive space near parent firms and research
facilities was crucial to all three types of companies.
Companies such as Bracon, Dennison, and Raytheon came and left throughout the
1950s and 1960s. Many came temporarily, many suffered short lives, and a few grew
until they were forced to move by labor shortages and a lack of space. Indeed, the
Assabet Mill was a microcosm of the state’s economy. Throughout this period it housed
such mature industries as machinery, clothing, paper, and textiles; such emerging
industries as plastics and modern defense systems; and, finally, such embryonic hightechnology industries as audio and computer manufacturing firms.8 As time went by,
there were fewer and fewer of the traditional companies and more of the high-technology
companies occupying the old mill.
Of all the companies that moved into the mill, one stands out for its tremendous
economic success. In 1957 the Digital Equipment Corporation leased 8,680 square feet
and began to build a new “minicomputer” (Digital Equipment Corporation 1977). With
three employees the company set out to develop an inexpensive, practical, and reliable
computer for the mass market. Beginning with venture capital of $70,000, the company
expanded until, twenty-five years later, it had 68,000 employees worldwide, more than $4
billion in annual sales, and more than fifty plants (Digital Equipment Corporation 1982,
20). In Maynard alone the corporation employed 2,000 workers by 1983. In 1974 the
company purchased the mill and slowly began to replace the tenants with its own
workers. Today it is the sole occupant of the mill. In a recent cover story Time magazine
summarized the Digital experience as follows:
Near the corner of Main and Walnut Streets in the small town of Maynard, Massachusetts, stands
a massive complex of aged-brick buildings…. the noisy machines and grease-stained factory
floors have given way to offices where engineers huddle over glowing oscilloscopes.… the
woolen mill has been reborn as the headquarters of the Digital Equipment Corp.… That
metamorphosis is symbolic of a sweeping transformation that is creating the New Economy.
(1983, 62)

The transformation from textiles to starter companies and branch plants to high
technology in Maynard is now complete. Once again the mill is full and holds a single
company with the “world’s largest” designation (Dun’s Review 1979, 48-49).
Analysis of Critical Factors
What happened to cause the diversification and transformation of the Assabet
Mill? Was it purely a matter of luck or that the mill was located on the fringe of a
bustling metropolitan area? Or were there critical decisions that guided the mill
revitalization effort into a direction where it could succeed? The answer is not easily
found, but certainly includes elements of both. The critical elements are explained
below.
On Luck
The role of luck is hard to define. The redevelopment of the mill occurred during
a substantial growth period when innovative and expanding companies were in need of
space. The new owners of the Assabet Mill were able to ride an economic wave.9 In this
case they were lucky to have the facility under their control. The owners were also
fortunate enough to buy cheaply, be patient, and have sound marketing sense. The role of
luck, in a final analysis, can be found only in that the owners took advantage of an
economic boom and focused on growing companies.
On Growth Waves
The fact that the Assabet Mill became available during a growth wave is not the
whole story. Other nearby mills were becoming available during the same time. Instead
of attracting innovative or growth industries, however, their owners tended to attract
other mature industries or warehousing operations. How the mill owners took advantage
of the changing economy was perhaps the most critical factor in successful revitalization.
As examples, the experiences of Lowell, Lawrence, and the Blackstone Valley and
Quinebaug Valley towns show remarkable similarity. In each there was an initial
tendency to promote or passively allow use of the mills for mature industries. In many
cases, the collapse of a textile company would be only temporary. These types of
companies, with few major capital requirements, had the ability to start up again easily
under new ownership. Unfortunately, the new owners typically were under-financed and
lacked the sophistication needed to compete in the highly competitive textile market. As
a condition for staying in the community, the new owners often would ask for tax and
wage concessions, which inevitably were granted. Hence the towns ended up with less
property tax revenue, and its workers had less pay (Bluestone and Harrison 1982, 97;
Browne 1984 A3). Inevitably, if the companies were poorly managed, they would
collapse. If they were well managed, they became attractive to speculators, who,
realizing the poor long-term prospects for textiles in New England, would milk the assets
and close the business. Then the cycle would begin anew. In many instances this cycle
is still at work, resulting in community stagnation, falling tax revenues, and low-paying,
dead-end jobs.10

The new mill owners in Maynard, with the backing of the town’s leadership,
chose not to court the mature industries. Both parties recognized that the products of
mature industries could be made less expensively elsewhere and that new market forces
were at work. Their perspectives were accurate, for a review of the history of New
England’s industries shows that as soon as a product no longer is dependent on
innovation or research, it is likely that it can be made more efficiently elsewhere in this
country or abroad (Malecki 1984, 265).
The reindustrialization of Lowell, Massachusetts, offers both significant
similarities to and differences from that of Maynard. Lowell, although a city, had similar
socioeconomic, labor force, and locational characteristics. Its mills, in the late 1940s and
1950s, housed outmoded machines operated by union tradesmen in depreciated
structures. Its textile workforce eroded much more slowly, however, than that of
Maynard. This erosion continued well into the 1970s. At that time the city began to
attract computer, aerospace, and technical instrument companies – all of which fit the
category of innovative or growth firms. Since 1970 Lowell has boomed to the point
where it is now being hailed as a “model for reindustrialization for older cities throughout
the United States that have lost jobs in traditional manufacturing industries” (Flynn 1984,
39).
Now, in the 1980s, a similar phenomenon is occurring in Lawrence,
Massachusetts. This city, once the headquarters of the American Woolen Company
empire, has seen a steady erosion of its economic and population base for more than
thirty-five years. Beset with dying industries, an outmigration of middle-class people,
intense competition for industrial development from its suburban neighbors, and a poor
image as a place to do business, the city could do little but watch its own demise (Walsh
1978b, 11). Finally, in 1983, it launched the Lawrence Strategy – a program designed to
stimulate the reindustrialization of the city’s economy through the reuse of its millions of
square feet of mill space (Yudis 1983, A73). The strategy, interestingly, focuses upon the
same mix of mature, innovative, and growth-oriented companies that located in Maynard
in the 1950s.
What was different? The most glaring differences were that the mills in Lowell
and Lawrence were separately owned, the management and marketing skills of the
owners were at differing levels, the companies were in varying financial conditions, and
the frequent response of local government was to help protect the industries that it had.
Transforming the job base of one mill complex in a small town where workers,
community leaders, and new owners were in common agreement was a much simpler
task than changing a complex, pluralistic, urban community that housed many mills with
separate owners. The end result was that Lowell’s and Lawrence’s recoveries were much
slower than that of Maynard.
On Marketing
While textiles, shoes, shipbuilding, and heavy manufacturing companies were
leaving Massachusetts, the state was beginning to expand its economic base through
emerging electronic, plastic, and paper companies. The new owners marketed the
Assabet Mill toward these new firms and succeeded. The new tenants were of three
types: They were starter companies that were largely in a research/development phase,

they were branch plants of expanding nearby companies, or they were spinoffs from other
firms. The location of the mill was important to all three types.
Starter companies were attracted to the mill’s location because it was within a
one-hour commute of the research facilities at Harvard, MIT, and other Boston research
facilities and laboratories. Furthermore, Route 128, the center of the then-emerging hightechnology industries, was less than fifteen miles away. Finally, such innovative
organizations as MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory, the General Radio Corporation, Sperry Rand,
and the MITRE Corporation, and the U.S. Air Force’s Hanscom Field were even closer.
The ability to interact with other innovators was indeed a strong locational asset.
For branch plants, Maynard’s location in an area of active non-textile
manufacturing was important. Centers of rapidly expanding paper, plastics, electronics,
and telecommunications manufacturing were all located in nearby towns. Thus, when
inexpensive space became available in the mill, these companies took advantage of the
opportunity. By so doing, they were able to minimize the time/distance/communication
problems that so often plague expanding companies.11
The spinoff companies were attracted by reasons similar to those of the starter
companies.12 They required cheap space, a trainable labor pool, and close proximity to
research centers. One of the spinoff companies was the Digital Equipment Corporation,
whose founder came out of MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory. Digital, in turn, has stimulated
spinoffs of its own (Hekman and Strong 1981, 43).
In attracting all three types of industry, location was important, but was not the
only factor of importance. If it had been, then other transforming mill cities and towns
would have recovered in much the same way as Maynard did. Such has not been the
case. A look at Lowell, Lawrence, and Haverhill on the north-northwest fringe of
metropolitan Boston; Milford, Hopedale, Franklin, and the Blackstone Valley towns
surrounding Worcester; and the industrial towns of Marlboro, Hudson, and Clinton
immediately west of Maynard all show communities with similar locational attributes
(Central Massachusetts Regional Planning Commission 1982; Dunwell 1978; National
Trust for Historic Preservation 1983; Walsh 1978a).
On Labor
At first glance, there did not appear to be a ready supply of labor, since most of
the mill workers either had found work elsewhere or had retired. Further, the town was
not growing, so few additional workers were moving into town (Massachusetts
Department of Commerce 1953, 1). Adjacent towns were growing rapidly, however, and
the two nearby military bases, Fort Devens and Hanscom Airfield, were bringing spouses
of young, poorly paid soldiers and airmen to the area.13 Moreover, there was a
perception, as noted by a former mill foreman, that many workers from Maynard would
prefer to find work in their community and, given the opportunity in a growth field,
would come back to the mill (The New York Times 1954, 1). These factors, coupled
with several highway improvements that shortened the commuting range for potential
workers, made Maynard a prime location for attracting labor.
Was the labor situation unique? It wasn’t in terms of supply: other mill cities and
towns had more workers available than in Maynard. Other cities and towns also had
workers with demonstrated records of production and highly trained skills in

manufacturing. Other cities and towns also were recipients of the same highway
improvements as Maynard. What stands out is the nature of the jobs to which these
workers were attracted. They were in areas where innovation and growth were expected.
For most of the workers, these jobs represented their first chance to expand their skills
and to take advantage of opportunities for upward mobility.
On the Town’s Characteristics
The Town of Maynard as a community was also an advantage. Maynard was a
classic urban town. Its area was only 5.7 square miles, and its population had remained
nearly constant at about 7,000 from 1920 through 1960 (Massachusetts Department of
Commerce 1961, 1). Most of the town’s citizens occupied a 107-acre area surrounding
the mill. Within the buildable sections of town, the population density approached sixty
persons per acre. It had adequate sewer and water systems in place and no need for the
extensive replacement or expansion of capital improvements. More significantly, little
space was available for dramatic growth. Thus, taxes were most likely to grow only as
the cost of services rose rather than as a result of feeding growth; for that reason tax
increases could be predicted reasonably well. Through the 1950s Maynard was a wellserviced, stable town with little debt, few growth pressures, and relatively few people
who needed unemployment or welfare assistance. It was a working-class community that
had a tradition of providing municipal assistance in any way that would promote mill
operations. The new owners and the companies that chose to rent space in the mill found
a strongly supportive community.
This spirit of cooperation could be seen clearly in the response of the town’s
leadership to the mill’s closing. Throughout the period of imminent collapse and the
period following the close of the mill, the town leadership played an active role in
pursuing reindustrialization opportunities. Once the mill was sold, however, the
leadership retreated to a passive position. There was a perception on the part of the town
leadership that the new owners could handle the revitalization efforts effectively and that
local government should lend support only when asked.14 Such a perception was in
keeping with the paternalistic traditions of the former owners of the mill, who regularly
and effectively promoted the mill’s interest as being no different from the town’s. The
phrase “as the mill goes, so goes the town” was (and still is) commonly heard.
This noninterventionary position by the local government also was not surprising,
given that there had been previous closings throughout the mill’s existence. The people
were accustomed to coping with strikes, shutdowns, slowdowns, depressions, and layoffs
(Maynard Historical Committee 1971, 28-38). The pullout by American Woolen,
although potentially dramatic in its long-term effects, was not so devastating as to be out
of character with the town’s past. There was no panic or desire for quick-fix solutions.15
Instead, one found a sense of quiet patience and optimism that the town would recover
once again.
Where was municipal planning in all this? Planning as a function of government
was essentially ignored. In fact, as in most small New England towns, there was no
professional planning or economic development staff. Further, zoning and subdivision
controls were not critically important, because the town was quite near capacity. A
master plan was prepared under the federal 701 planning assistance program but was

promptly shelved. Nor did the town’s leadership participate in the governmental grant
programs that were becoming available in the late 1950s. With municipal facilities and
infrastructure showing little strain from age or overuse, with little population growth, and
with a steadily expanding workforce in the mill, the leadership saw little need for strong
planning: If the mill was healthy, so was the town.
A Clean Break
In summation, the reindustrialization of the Assabet Mill was a function of many
coalescing and interrelated factors. To begin with, Maynard was located in a region
where pools of skilled labor, entrepreneurial talent, research and development assistance,
and venture capital opportunities were readily available (Browne 1984, A4-A5). These
critical factors created the environment for change. The town’s location, the structural
condition of the buildings, community support, and timeliness were critical. Those
factors, however, were not absent in any other mill town undergoing transformation in
eastern or central Massachusetts. What was different in Maynard was the willingness of
the town’s leadership and mill owners to court growth industries and their confidence that
market forces would work.
The effectiveness of the new owners in attracting innovative and growing firms
meant that Maynard made a sweeping, clean break with its past. It also helped the town
recover far more quickly than any other mill town in eastern or central Massachusetts.
Implications for Planning
How is the Maynard story relevant to present-day planners? It is a difficult
question to answer, for the transition was completed more than twenty-five years ago in
an economic period significantly different from today. Moreover, the transformation of
Maynard took place in Greater Boston, with its universities, research centers, tradition of
responding to economic change, well-established transportation system, trained labor
force, and mixed economic base. This experience cannot be replicated easily elsewhere.
It was (and is) different from the one-industry towns of the South and Midwest, where the
factories are larger, the economic base smaller, and the work alternatives fewer. Still,
several generic lessons can be offered to planners who are going through the problems of
plant closing and reindustrialization in one-company towns.
On Maintaining Industrial Assets
At no time in the Maynard case was thought given to changing the use of the mill
buildings to commercial, office, or housing uses. Yet too often, planners across the
country are viewing these old, often ugly structures as prime candidates for nonindustrial
uses. Such proposals should be carefully reexamined. In the Northeast, many of the old
mill cities and towns have destroyed such structures or have helped to place them in
residential or commercial use (Langenbach 1975, 26). Cheap, raw space is critical.
Indeed, many of the high-technology firms, including Digital, Wang, Honeywell, Prime,
and Data General, have made use of such old structures as they grew (Hay and Bernstein

1981, 1; Kidder 1981, 16). Further, a review of Massachusetts’s industrial towns shows
that in many cases the old mills are now full.
The problem of keeping these buildings in industrial use is most difficult in towns
that have the immediate need for more commercial space or housing and that have little
short-term demand for industrial space. Should the planner promote the new uses?
Although local conditions should prevail, the answer should only be decided after careful
consideration of the future industrial needs of the community. Keeping these old
structures in active industrial use may not result in an improvement in the physical
character of the town. It certainly will, however, help provide the space in which new
jobs will be generated.
On Building from Within
The writings of Birch, Bluestone, and Harrison, among others, have pointed out
the need to build an industrial base from within one’s own community or from nearly
growing industries (Birch 1979; Bluestone and Harrison 1982). This point was clearly
adhered to in the Maynard case. There were no trips to Tokyo or to the Midwest to
attract companies thinking of moving into the area. Instead there was a clear decision by
the owners to market toward local firms. In fact, the maximum distance moved by any
firm to the mill was less than thirty miles. What this points toward is the need for the
planner to have a firm grasp of the industrial strengths and weaknesses of the community
and the region. It also points toward the desirability of a strongly localized industrial
policy that is designed to enhance homegrown, growth-oriented companies.
In the Maynard case, the new owners made an intuitive decision to market
regionally. The evidence now available confirms that their decision was correct, both
specifically and generically. The role of the planner’s assistance in identifying industrial
firms in need of help is essential. This assistance can and should be oriented toward
eliminating bureaucratic/legislative impediments, streamlining the permit process,
identifying relocation opportunities, and helping obtain governmental grants and loans
(Dotson 1983, 362).
On Marketing toward Growth Industries
It is extremely difficult for any public official to tell a crowd of several hundred
laid-off textile workers that their occupation has no future in their home town. It is also
saddening to watch many of these workers take early retirement, settle for lower wages in
a service job, or simply drop out of the economy. Yet the lesson of many mill towns is
that few long-term benefits are to be gained from providing artificial life to such
companies. The subsidies, tax breaks, and lower wages that are required by such
companies rarely work. In effect, the benefits of such actions often are limited to buying
time for the workers.
Nowhere can the dangers of looking to outmoded industries be seen more vividly
than in the latest findings of a study on dislocated workers undertaken by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston: In each of the past three recessions there have been major job
losses in the textile industries. More significantly, these jobs, because of many

international and national trade factors, are never recovered. They simply vanish
(Browne 1985, 18).
Where, then, does the displaced worker fit in a changing economy? In the
Maynard case, the worker was able to find initial employment in companies that required
little more from the workers than a willingness to learn new operational techniques. Onthe-job training was sufficient. Today, however, the skills required by most hightechnology companies require additional schooling or formal retraining. These new
requirements make the transition extremely difficult. Indeed, between 1958 and 1975,
fewer than 3 percent of displaced textile workers in New England were able to find work
with the region’s high-technology companies (Bluestone and Harrison 1982, 97). All of
this points to the need to ensure that workers have the opportunity to build on their skills
and, if necessary, to retrain. It also points to the need to protect and enhance healthy
mature industries. If a mature industry worker is displaced and fails to retool, then that
worker probably will have to settle for a lower wage scale and lower quality of life
(Armstrong and Mullin 1984).
On Passive Roles
Planners, like their business counterparts, have become increasingly oriented
toward short-term results. They also have become increasingly involved in intervening in
specific projects to ensure that positive actions occur. While we understand such
responses, there is also a role for the planner in a more noninterventionary position.
In Maynard, the town leaders, functioning as planners, developed an informal,
open-minded process that was designed to stimulate and accept change. They never
made a formal plan, stated goals explicitly, created a delineated methodology, or hired a
staff to implement their ideas. On the other hand, they recognized that they needed
broad-based citizen support, some consulting assistance, and continued communication
with the American Woolen Company. In short, the leadership saw its role as simply
developing, a positive climate in which development could occur.
On Paternalism and Cooperation
There is usually an uneasy truce between the owners of the mill and the residents
of a mill town. On the one side, there is the desire on the part of the citizens to live, their
lives as free of encumbrances as possible. On the other side, there is the mill owner’s
control over the economic destiny of the citizens. How did the citizens of Maynard
react?
Over the years, the citizens exhibited an increasing sense of independence from
the mill owners. Nowhere could this be observed better than through the Maynard
workers’ frequent willingness to strike and their strong advocacy of unionism during the
American Woolen Company years (Adamic 1931, 753). But their independence was not
total. A review of the town’s annual reports shows that the townspeople rarely voted
against any request from the mill owners for a public service or improvement. In short,
there appeared to be a mutuality of interest. If the mill owners provided jobs for the
citizens and paid their share in taxes, then the town would support the requests of the mill
owners. This mutuality of interests can be noted best in terms of the town’s attitude

toward taxing the mill. Through the Depression years (1932-1938), like virtually every
other city and town in the nation, the town regularly cut the value of the real estate and
the rate of property taxation. Once the recovery began in 1938, the town chose to freeze
the value of the mill property at $839,645. This figure remained almost constant until
1953. At that time, with the sale of the buildings to Maynard Industries, there was a
further cut in the assessed value. The purpose of the new cut was in recognition of the
low selling price and as a statement that the town wanted to give the new owners a
chance to operate at as low a cost as possible.
Finally, the mill owners wished to keep property taxes as low as possible. Their
requests were supported with such regularity that, even after the mill closed, the town’s
fiscal position, based on cash reserves and low debt, was rated the best in the state (The
Beacon 1953b, 1). It is indeed ironic when a town, one year after its major employer
shuts down, receives a letter of achievement from the governor for having a full treasury
(The Beacon 1953a, 1).
The lesson in this case is that there is much to be gained from enlightened selfinterest. If the developer asks, for example, for a tax break during a start-up period, for
improved infrastructure, or for new parking facilities, the town should consider the
developer’s needs carefully and establish “quid pro quo” positions (i.e., whether the
developer will hire local residents first). The Town of Maynard used this approach quite
effectively in its assessment decisions.
On Developing Small Spaces
The reindustrialization of old mill buildings often is made complicated because
they are centrally heated and designed with open bays. How can these spaces be
economically occupied? The new owners faced this problem by investing in new heating
systems and partitioning equipment that enabled them, in effect, to close down unused
portions. By so doing, they were able to market the space to small users.
The issue is far more complex today than in the 1950s. There are new fire code
regulations that require electronically supported sprinkler systems, new elevator
regulations, and a host of occupational safety and health regulations. All must be met
before new uses can be placed. They are expensive and are primary reasons for delaying
or forestalling the reuse of the structures. Thus they are areas where public intervention
can be a major boost.
Using these Lessons
The lessons noted above will not guarantee the success of another town’s mill
revitalization effort. Too many local idiosyncrasies enter into any company’s decision to
locate in a community to make that guarantee. They can provide guidance, however, in
setting the stage for reuse and for thinking about possible approaches and their potential
effects. These lessons are certainly worthy of consideration.

End Note
In the Maynard case, managerial acumen, a supportive town government, a supply
of skilled and unskilled labor, careful corporate planning, luck, and opportunism
combined to create, for the moment, a happy ending. The town has a booming mill, a
strong economic base, and an extremely low unemployment rate. Yet once again the
town is dominated by one industry. Admittedly, the industry is healthy and prosperous.
The fact remains that the town’s economy depends on how well the Digital Equipment
Corporation performs.
Is there reason to be concerned? There are no indicators at present that the
company will leave, but it is reaching maturity, it is no longer expanding in Maynard, and
it is subject to increasing competition (Boston Globe 1983; Rosenberg 1982). Finally, as
the computer industry becomes less dependent on research and development, Digital
most likely will phase down its production in Massachusetts. Where this will leave
Maynard is impossible to determine. All we know is that there is a giant in the mill, and
when it moves it affects the entire town and its region.
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1

It should be noted that there are important differences between textile and high-technology industries;
between the Great Depression and the present; between the worker of the first half of the century and of
today; and between the market structure of previous times and the present. It is clear, however, that the
town was and is dominated by one industry, one major property taxpayer, one major land user, and one
major employer.
2
Maynard was incorporated as a town in 1871. Before that time it was called the Assabet Village. The
village straddled the banks of the Assabet River and was located between the towns of Stow and Sudbury,
Massachusetts (see Gutteridge 1921. 7).
3
A review of the Harrigan-Porter “End-Game Stratgies for Declining Business” shows that all the major
factors needed by the American Woolen Company for an easy exit from Maynard were present (Harrigan
and Porter 1983, 117).
4
Interview with Leo F. Mullin, former chairman of the Maynard Board of Selectmen, 10 August 1983.

5

This proposal was similar to a plan developed by Textron in order to extract concessions from the citizens
of Nashua, New Hampshire, concerning the continued operation of the Textron-Nashua factory (see
Bluestone and Harrison 1982, 183).
6
The Town of Maynard Assessor’s Records are located in the Town Hall. They were reviewed in July
1982 and are the source of the information on assessed values throughout this article.
7
For an overview of this company see “Canco’s Team of Men in Motion”, Business Week (1959).
8
For an excellent analysis of this transformation see Harrison (1982) and Kuhn (1982).
9
The term “economic wave” was taken from Harrison (1982, 42-46). The inability of owners of industrial
properties to take advantage of these periodic waves is one of the most critical factors in retarding industrial
recovery. The Massachusetts Commissioner of Commerce, Ronald Ansin, points to the mill cities and
towns along state routes 2 and 146 as examples. Interview with Ronald Ansin, 11 February 1985.
10
Economist Lester Thurow (1979, 77) maintains that the slow pace of disinvestment is a key problem in
reconstructing our industrial base.
11
This point is well articulated in Birch (1979).
12
A series of relatively new terms are being used to describe spinoff plants. Jane Jacobs calls them
“tethered enterprises” (1984, 98). Others refer to them by such terms as “skunk works”, “industrial runts”,
and incubator industries (Commentary of industrialist Loren Schultz, U.S. Small Business Administration
Incubator Industries Conference, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 27 February 1985; also see Purcell 1984).
13
Interview with Albert J. Mello, former plant manager of the H.H. Scott Company, 26 December 1982.
14
This response was remarkably different from that of Youngstown in the late 1970s. Competing groups
with different goals and agendas attempted to organize the citizens into various directions. The splintering
of effort that occurred was a factor in reducing the pace of the recovery process. See Buss and Redburn
(1983, 182-89).
15
This response was similar to the Youngstown experience. To quote: “ … Continuity, rather than change,
marked the period following the closing” (Buss and Redburn 1983, 87).

